In Coronavirus, a ‘Battle’ That Could Humble China’s Strongman
With
Xi Jinping firmly in control, the Chinese government has stepped up its
response to the Wuhan crisis, but the effort has been plagued by
bureaucracy and a lack of transparency.
By Steven Lee Myers and
BEIJING — It took thousands of infections and scores of deaths from a mysterious virus
for China’s authoritarian leader to publicly say what had become
glaringly obvious to many in recent weeks: The country is facing a grave
public health crisis.
After his declaration,
the leader, Xi Jinping, put China on a virtual war footing to cope with
the unfolding epidemic of the coronavirus. He convened an extraordinary
session of the Communist Party’s top political body, issuing orders for
handling the crisis with the crisp, somber stoicism of a field marshal.
“We’re
sure to be able to win in this battle,” he proclaimed on Saturday
before his six grim-faced colleagues on the party’s Politburo Standing
Committee.
Compared
to the very low bar set by the Chinese leadership’s secrecy and
inaction during the SARS epidemic in 2002 and 2003, Mr. Xi has responded
with speed and alacrity to the latest health emergency, a pneumonialike virus that at last official count has killed 56, sickened thousands in China and spread around the world.
But
there are also signs that the government, especially at the regional
level in Hubei Province, the source of the outbreak, was slow to
recognize the danger and is continuing to mishandle the crisis.
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“Substantively,
the response this time is more or less the same,” said Minxin Pei, a
professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.
“Local officials downplayed the outbreak at the initial, but crucial,
stage of the outbreak. The media was muzzled. The public was kept in the
dark. As a result, valuable time was lost.”
The turnaround from complacency to nationwide mobilization typifies how China can respond to unexpected crisis
like a lumbering giant, reluctant to stir, but then capable of
shattering urgency. It represents both sides of the authoritarian
political bargain under Mr. Xi.
A
fear of upsetting the party’s protocols and leaders’ desire for
unruffled stability can deter even officials who want to do well by the
public. Conversely, the government can operate with brutal efficiency
when it wants.
It was only after a
brief written statement under Mr. Xi’s name on Jan. 20, when he was
touring a military base and shopping exposition in Yunnan Province, that
the vast Chinese state bureaucracy began to shudder into action.
Officials
then quickly acknowledged the dangers of the coronavirus and ordered
drastic measures to stop the spread — perhaps, experts said, belatedly —
including the lockdown of much of the province where the epidemic
emerged, penning in 56 million people. The government also ordered the
construction of two hospitals in Wuhan to deal exclusively with patients
afflicted with the coronavirus, which are expected to open within days,
not months or years.
“The thing about
China is that they can mobilize agencies and resources faster than
anybody else can,” said Richard McGregor, a senior fellow at the Lowy
Institute in Sydney and author of “Xi Jinping: The Backlash.” “The other side is that they can conceal things.”
“In China there is no independent entity that can get on the front foot and disseminate information,” he added.
From
a localized medical mystery a few weeks ago, the coronavirus has
erupted as one of the most complex and unpredictable tests for Mr. Xi
since he came to power more than seven years ago. Over that time, he has
by some measures established himself as the most formidable Chinese
leader since Mao Zedong.
The epidemic
and the effectiveness of the government’s response remain subject to
many unknowns, but the outbreak comes at a time when Mr. Xi has already
been facing quiet whispers about his political acumen. In the past year,
he has experienced repeated setbacks on some of the most vital issues
on his agenda.
Protests against China’s tightening grip continue to convulse Hong Kong. Rancor with Washington was only partly eased by a trade deal that some said required China to promise too many concessions. Two weeks ago, voters in Taiwan,
the island democracy that Mr. Xi has made clear should join a greater
China, resoundingly re-elected a president despised by Beijing.
Mr.
Xi’s sheer dominance, according to several experts and political
insiders, may be contributing to his problems by hampering internal
debate that could help avoid misjudgments. Beijing, for example, has
underestimated the staying power of the protesters in Hong Kong and the
public support behind them.
“It’s a
paradox,” said Rong Jian, an independent scholar of Chinese politics in
Beijing. “It’s precisely because Xi is so powerful that policy problems
often arise — nobody dares disagree, and problems are spotted too late.”
While
state and local officials have been criticized, the public health
system has been credited with responding effectively, particularly
compared to the response to the SARS crisis.
In
that case, officials covered up the extent of the viral outbreak for
months, almost certainly abetting its spread and exacerbating the death
toll, which reached nearly 800.
This time, even as officials in Wuhan said nothing publicly, government scientists shared information with the World Health Organization on the last day of 2019, isolated the virus, and posted details about it on an international database 10 days later.
That
allowed experts from around the world to quickly conclude that the new
coronavirus, like the one from SARS, had very likely originated in bats
and made the leap to humans through infection of another mammal in a
market in Wuhan.
The Lancet, one of the leading medical journals, praised China’s handling of the outbreak so far in an editorial.
“The
lessons from the SARS epidemic — where China was insufficiently
prepared to implement infection control practices — have been
successfully learned,” it wrote. “By most accounts, Chinese authorities
are meeting international standards and isolating suspected cases and
contacts, developing diagnostic and treatment procedures, and
implementing public education campaigns.”
The
journal went on to emphasize that the ultimate success of the response
would “depend on maintaining trust between the authorities and the local
population.”
Mr. Xi’s government, despite its call to arms, may have already undercut that trust.
On
the local level in Wuhan, people have vented anger and frustration,
which is percolating on social media despite censorship. In widely
circulated, and then censored, comments, a senior journalist with The
Hubei Daily, the province’s main party newspaper, called for a change of
leadership in Wuhan.
“With this
extraordinarily grim situation worsening and expanding by the day, those
currently in office lack that commanding leadership,” the journalist,
Zhang Ouya, wrote on Sina.com Weibo, a popular Chinese social media
service.
There is evidence, too, that
the local authorities kept a lid on the crisis in the first days of
January so as not to upset cheerful tone for a provincial legislative
session that is a highlight of the local political cycle.
“This
year will be a major landmark year,” Wang Xiaodong, the provincial
governor, told the legislative members. “Let us unite even more closely
around the party central leadership with Comrade Xi Jinping at the
core.”
Mr. Wang is now widely accused of underplaying the virus threat.
“China
is a much more decentralized place than it appears,” said David Cowhig,
a former American diplomat who served 10 years in China and monitored
health and science issues.
“Local
officials have great discretion; China is a coalition of ‘little’ Big
Brothers,” he said. “Xi realizes this and is trying to re-centralize
China.”
Yanzhong
Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign
Relations who studies China, said that the centralization of power since
the SARS crisis did not appear to have strengthened expertise at the
local level or the willingness of underequipped regional hospitals to
report.
“I think the central health
authorities are trying to be more transparent,” he said, “but the local
government remains loath to share disease related information in a
timely and accurate manner.”
Not all the blame can fall on the officials in Wuhan.
The
central authorities still control the political and propaganda
apparatus, which has sought to minimize the severity of the crisis.
Before the standing committee’s meeting on Saturday, Mr. Xi and other
senior officials went about their business as if there were no crisis,
appearing at a banquet on Thursday in the Great Hall of the People to
celebrate the Lunar New Year.
When he did speak, Mr. Xi emphasized the need for preserving public stability.
The
phrase alludes to the fear of popular unrest boiling over, which is, as
ever, the party state’s highest priority. It could become a reality if
the epidemic, as predicted, inflicts sustained hardship on the economy
and people’s livelihood.
“The truth is
in a public-health emergency; it’s not just the medical professionals
who matter,” Mr. McGregor said. “It’s the management of it in the
government and in the public that matters, too. It’s hard to argue that
they’ve done that well.”
Steven Lee Myers reported from Beijing, and Chris Buckley from Wuhan, China. Claire Fu contributed research.
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